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Of Plain English and Plain Meaning
By Virginia C. Thomas

A

n increasing number of jurists
have a passion for plain English—and they are not afraid
to talk about it. Pivotal events
in the plain English movement in Michigan
date back to the development of court forms
by the District Judges Forms Committee in
the mid-1970s.1 Judge Frederick G. Mather,
then president of the District Judges Association, is credited with initiating the development of recommended general forms under the District Court Rules.2 Today, judges
at the state and federal levels regularly express their views on plain English inside
and outside of their judicial opinions. Some
even have used a different approach to inter
preting statutory language. These are some
of their stories.

Opinions on (and in) opinions
In a recent interview, Judge Richard
Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reflected on the use of legal jargon in court opinions.3 In his view,
judges should avoid legalese. Regarding
the term arguendo, for example, the judge
posits, “[W]hy on earth would you use the
Latin word when you have a perfectly good
English substitution?” 4
Posner’s approach supports access to
justice:
One thing that’s troublesome is that there
are a great many litigants who do not have
lawyers and I think to not have a lawyer
and to be involved in a lawsuit is very, very
difficult. But it’s made more difficult if
what the judges say, whether orally or in
writing, is in an esoteric, professional discourse that laypeople don’t understand.5
He has not confined his views to legal
commentary. In a recent case, United States
v Dessart,6 he issued a concurring opinion

that questioned “some of the verbal formulas in the majority opinion” such as the use
of hyperbole, metaphor, and other rhetorical
devices. He concluded, “Everything judges
do can be explained in straightforward language—and should be.” 7
On a different aspect of clear communication, Judge Laurence Silberman of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
criticized the use of abbreviations and acronyms by attorneys for both parties in a recent case. His ruling in National Association
of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v U.S.
Department of Energy 8 included a footnote
stating that the attorneys “abandoned any
attempt to write in plain English, instead
abbreviating every conceivable agency and
statute involved, familiar or not . . . .” 9 In a
subsequent case, he reportedly told the attorneys that they had not read the pertinent
court rules and described their overuse of
acronyms as “painful.”10
This kind of thing frustrates even the
most experienced law librarians, particularly when the acronyms are not familiar
or readily found. Reliance on even commonly used acronyms can give rise to some
pretty peculiar interpretations. For example, stricken on leave is abbreviated SOL,
as is statute of limitations and sadly outta
luck (in the polite form).11 Time to bring out
the Bieber’s! 12

Potholes or pavement failures?
Sometimes, judges make a practice of
speaking truth to power outside of court
opinions. Mark P. Painter, now retired from
the bench, served as an Ohio Court of Appeals judge from 1995 to 2009, when he
was elected to the United Nations Appeals
Tribunal by the General Assembly. Painter
has been an ardent advocate of good legal
writing throughout his career. He has written three books and more than 100 columns
on the subject 13 and has taught advanced
legal writing.
Painter is respected for his direct, fervent commentary on plain English tempered
with a sense of humor. For example, one of
his latest columns highlighted the following example of “amok” words:
Quantas airlines got [Plain English Foundation] prizes in both [2013] and 2014. In
2013, Quantas described a near-collision
as a loss of separation. For 2014, Quantas
explained the cause of a flight delay as a
pavement failure. There was a pothole in
the runway that had to be filled in before
the plane could take off.14

From legal writing to
statutory interpretation
Good legal writing, whether used to craft
arguments in a brief or write a motion for

Good legal writing, whether used to craft
arguments in a brief or write a motion for
summary judgment, is essential to the practice
of law.
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summary judgment, is essential to the practice of law. Which tools are appropriate for
courts to use in interpreting the ordinary
meaning of legislative language continues to
be a matter of debate among judges. In a recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v Rasabout,15 the majority and concurring justices
disagreed as to whether the Court should
use a “corpus linguistics analysis”16 to determine the meaning of the statutory phrase
unlawful discharge of a firearm. Should
each of 12 shots fired by the defendant constitute a discrete discharge of the weapon
and carry a separate conviction or should
all 12 be consolidated in a single count?
The Court considered the derivation of
discharge as well as the statutory context,
dictionary definition, and commonsense
meaning of the term. It determined that
discharge referred to each shot fired—and
each shot constituted a separate violation,
affirming the appeals court.
Now for the rest of the story. In the majority opinion, Utah Supreme Court Chief
Justice Parrish also admonished Associate
Chief Justice Lee for his concurring opinion, which “charges the court with coming
to this conclusion by plucking a definition
from a dictionary on the basis of cloaked
intuition.”17 Lee defended his position, arguing that dictionaries are also compiled from
linguistic corpora, which may be useful to
courts for statutory interpretation. He was
simply applying a new tool to the process.
Earlier this year, the Michigan Supreme
Court encountered a similar challenge in
People v Harris.18 The Court addressed the
question of whether the Disclosures by Law
Enforcement Officers Act (DLEOA)19 bars
the state from using the defendant law enforcement officers’ false statements made
during an earlier internal affairs investigation against them in the context of a pending criminal proceeding. Did the term information in the statute include false as well
as true statements?
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals. In delivering the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Zahra
wrote, “The plain language of the DLEOA
controls our resolution of this dispute and
compels us to agree with defendants.”20 As
in Rasabout, the Harris Court considered
the ordinary meaning of a term—in this case,

information. It examined the term in its statutory context and checked the definition
from three dictionaries. Unlike the Rasabout
Court, however, the Harris Court did apply
corpus linguistics analysis to the task. The
selected database, Corpus of Contemporary
American English, provided definitional and
contextual data that “strongly suggests that
the unmodified word ‘information,’ can describe either true or false statements.”21
In Harris, the Supreme Court specifically
criticized legislative analyses prepared by
Michigan House and Senate staff for their
lack of interpretive use or persuasive value.22
The Court chose instead to use empirical
data to interpret legislative language. Corpus linguistics analysis supersedes legislative analyses in this case. We may be seeing a new direction in the search for plain
meaning in Michigan statutory law. n

11. The Free Dictionary, Acronyms and Abbreviations
<http://acronyms.thefreedictionary.com/sol>.
12. Prince, Bieber’s Dictionary of Legal Abbreviations:
A Reference Guide for Attorneys, Legal Secretaries,
Paralegals, and Law Students (Getzville: William S
Hein & Co, 5th ed, 2001).
13. See Judge Mark Painter, Resume <http://www.
judgepainter.org/resume/MPP_Resume.pdf>.
14. Painter, Words Run Amok, Legal Writer #81
<http://www.judgepainter.org/number81.pdf>.
15. State v Rasabout, 356 P3d 1258 (Utah 2015).
16. Corpus linguistics is an approach to the study of
language based on large digital collections of written
and spoken language. “These databases can easily
be searched to retrieve examples of how words or
phrases have been used in different contexts at
different times.” Note, State v Rasabout, 129 Harv
L Rev 1468 (2016).
17. Rasabout, 356 P3d at 1,264.
18. People v Harris, 499 Mich 332;
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19. MCL 15.391 et seq.
20. Harris, 499 Mich at *4.
21. Id. at *5.
22. Id. at *6 n 48.
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